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1. Introduction 
 
The mix of volumes handled by the Universal Service Provider (USP) is changing.  Letter mail 
volumes are in decline and parcel volumes are growing.  These trends are expected to continue 
with the e-substitution of letter mail and the e-commerce of parcels.  Current costing methods are 
based on a letter mails market and not set up to take account of this change.  With the current 
method, the market trends lead to the transfer of common and joint costs to parcels, and 
consequently an ever increasing allocation of fully allocated costs per item within parcels.   The 
purpose of this paper is to look at the properties of the cost function that would provide a more 
intuitive and, potentially more appropriate, cost allocation in the changing circumstances. 
 
Cost allocation is included as part of the European Postal Services Directive, Article 14.3.  This 
sets out that “costs which can be directly assigned to a particular service or product shall be so 
assigned”; and “common costs, that is costs which cannot be directly assigned to a particular 
service or product, shall be allocated in the following manner (i) whenever possible, common 
costs shall be allocated on the basis of direct analysis of the origin of the costs themselves; (ii) 
when direct analysis is not possible, common cost categories shall be allocated on the basis of an 
indirect linkage to another cost category or group of cost categories for which a direct 
assignment or allocation is possible; the indirect linkage shall be based on comparable cost 
structures; (iii) when neither direct nor indirect measures of cost allocation can be found, the cost 
category shall be allocated on the basis of a general allocator computed by using the ratio of all 
expenses directly or indirectly assigned or allocated, on the one hand, to each of the universal 
services and, on the other hand, to the other services; (iv) common costs, which are necessary for 
the provision of both universal services and non-universal services, shall be allocated 
appropriately; the same cost drivers must be applied to both universal services and non-universal 
services.” 
 
Within the postal sector, Robinson and McMurdie (2009) developed an operational model and 
method for the allocation of cost using the drivers of class and products within the universal 
service; their approach allocated proportionately more cost to higher class and Universal Service 
Obligation (USO) products.  De Donder et al (2002) modelled parcels within the USP in the 
context of competition within the delivery to rural areas; in subsequent papers by De Donder et al 
(2008), the USP is characterised as having fixed costs and marginal costs for the provision of its 
services.  Mautino et al (2013) developed an approach to estimate long run average incremental 
costs for the postal sector.  This included an explanation of the economies of scale and scope 
found within outdoor collection and delivery; there are joint costs in outdoor delivery which mean 
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that the incremental cost of an additional item is often associated with the likelihood of having to 
deliver, and therefore walk up the path, to an address; the incremental cost of delivering an item 
reduces with increased volume, as the proportion of addresses visited increases at a decreasing 
rate.     
 
This paper develops a model with welfare maximisation by the USP with separate goods, subject 
to a budget constraint where there are marginal, joint and fixed costs which take account of the 
economies of scale and scope in delivery.  Under the Postal Services Directive, first direct costs 
are identified for goods, second indirect attributable costs are allocated and finally indirect non-
attributable costs are to be apportioned using EPMU.  In the context of the model, the direct costs 
are the marginal costs, the indirect attributable costs are the joint costs and additional unit costs 
and the indirect non-attributable costs are the residual fixed costs (i.e. the fixed costs less the 
marginal and joint (unit) costs).   
 
To focus on the principles of cost allocation the model has two goods of letters and parcels in 
outdoor delivery; the same model could be extended to include more dimensions but the outdoor 
delivery is a significant component of the USP and is known to have significant economies of 
scale and scope.  In the first two stages of analysis, the cost function includes the marginal and 
fixed costs for letters and parcels and, in the final stage, additionally a joint cost component.  The 
marginal costs increase at a decreasing rate and the joint cost is such that an increase in volume of 
one good increases the cost of the other good, but at a decreasing rate. Hence both marginal and 
joint costs reflect the presence of economies of scale. 
 
More specifically, the initial analysis assumes that the marginal costs for letters and parcels are 
separate and decreasing in volume, with the same mode of delivery method.  This is sufficient to 
obtain an outcome whereby the marginal cost of letters increases and that for parcels reduces as 
letter volumes reduce and parcels increase, such that the fixed cost (allocated under constant 
demand elasticity assumptions or equi-proportional mark up (EPMU)), leads to the unit cost of 
letters rising more than parcels. This is illustrated by a numerical example.  The illustration is then 
extended to consider the case where parcels are more demand elastic than letters, such that, under 
Ramsey rules, the movements in unit costs for letters and parcels are further enhanced.   
 
The second analysis takes account of two delivery methods for letters and parcels, one of fixed 
capacity trolleys, known as High Capacity Trolleys (HCTs), that are used on walks to carry letters 
and some  parcels, and one of a higher capacity vans which lend themselves more to parcels 
delivery.  The letters are assumed to have priority use of the HCTs and the residual space on a 
HCT is used for parcels, with residual parcels then delivered by van.  When the cost functional 
form is Cobb Douglas for a single route only, the results have similar properties to those in the 
initial analysis. 
 
The third analysis develops the second analysis further to include multiple routes where there is a 
distribution for the portion of HCT fill by letters by route.  When the cost functional form is Cobb 
Douglas assuming multiple routes, the results again can have similar properties to those in the 
initial analysis, but in this instance there are not only marginal and fixed costs, but also joint costs 
with the cost function having cross elasticities of its costs.     
 
The analytical model is set out and developed in Section 2.  The illustrations are included in 
Section 3.  Section 4 concludes.   
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2.  Models 
 
2.1  First model 
 
For the model there is one firm and two products, 1 and 2. One could be “packets” and the other one 
“letters”. The demands for the two products are independent of each other and given by  11 px  and  22 px  
where ix  denotes the quantity and ip  the price of good i . These demands are obtained when consumers 
maximize their utility 
     ,xpxpxUxU 21 221121   
 
 
for given 1p  and 2p , with respect to 1x  and 2x .  The cost function of the firm has both variable and fixed 
components, and components that can be attributed to one good versus overheads. 
 
With no joint cost and decreasing marginal costs the total cost function of the firm is given by:  
       ,FFxxcFxxcx,xC  2222111121  
 
with decreasing marginal costs:   0i'i xc  for i  = 1, 2. 
 
The firm maximises welfare subject to some profit constraint, where profit  , given by 
  212211 x,xCxpxp  , 
 
has to be larger than some minimum amount 0 .  
 
The Lagrangian expression of this problem is 
 
      .xpxpxUxUL  122112211  
 
When maximizing L  with respect to ip , the following Ramsey expression for good i  is obtained   ,
p
x/x,xCp
ii
ii

 1
1
21

  
 
where i  is the (absolute value of the) own-price elasticity of the demand for good i , and where 
        iiiiiii
i
xcxcxxc
x
xxC 
 '21 ,  
 
since marginal cost is decreasing. 
 
Observe that, since marginal cost is decreasing, the Ramsey formula with 0  generates prices (equal to 
marginal costs) that do not even cover variable costs. 
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If the volume of good 1 decreases for an exogenous reason (meaning, for any given price the demand is 
now lower) while the demand for good 2 increases, than marginal costs will increase for good 1 while they 
will decrease for good 2, meaning a larger price of good 1 and a smaller price for good 2. 
 
2.2 Second model 
 
The first model is developed to account for two modes of delivery.  Parcels are delivered jointly with 
letters using High Capacity Trolleys (HCT). When the capacity constraint of the HCT is binding, the 
parcels that cannot fit are delivered with a van. 
 
For simplicity it is assumed that there is a single, “aggregate” route, that the HCT capacity is large enough 
to deliver all letters but not large enough to accommodate all parcels.  
 
The volume of parcels delivered with HCT is denoted by Tx2 and the volume of parcels delivered by van is 
denoted by Vx2 , with 
222 xxx
VT  . 
 
The capacity per item taken by a letter in the HCT by a  and the capacity per item taken by a parcel by b , 
with ab  . The capacity constraint of the HCT is  
 
,Kbxax T  21  
 
and it is assumed that this constraint is binding (i.e., holds with equality). 
 
The following expression is then obtained 
 
,
b
axKxT 12
     (1) 
 
and  
 
,
b
axKxxxx TV 12222
      (2) 
 
The cost function for vans is denoted by 
     VVVVVV FxxcxC  2222   
 
and it is assumed that there are increasing returns to scale, so that marginal costs are decreasing: 
   .
x
xc
V
VV
0
2
2
22
2

  
 
The cost function for HCTs is  
       TTTT Fxxx,xC   12121  
 
When combined with (1), this yields 
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      TTT FbaxKxxxC   11121 /)(,  
 
Observe that this cost is only a function of 1x , with 
        
b
axKbaxKx
x
xxC TT 11
1
1
1
21 /)(, 
  
 
 
and 
        
,0/)(1,
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
21
2

 
b
baxKxK
x
xxC TT 
 
 
so that marginal costs are decreasing. 
 
Hence, this has similar properties to the first model with no joint costs but decreasing marginal costs. The 
role played by the number of letters, 1x , is more complex because having more letters shifts parcels from 
HTC to vans. The parameters used include: K, a and b (the capacity of a HCT in terms of both parcels and 
letters), the shape of Vc2 (the variable cost function for vans); and 
VF and TF (the fixed costs of vans and 
trolleys). 
 
2.3 Third model 
 
In a further development of the second model, it is assumed that some HCTs on some routes are not full so 
that the total volume of parcels delivered by HCT increases with the total amount of parcels delivered. As 
volumes increase, the capacity constraint on HCTs becomes binding for an increasing fraction of routes, so 
that the relationship between Tx2 and 2x  is concave and given by the function 
 
 22 xfxT   
 
with   1'0 2  xf  and   .x''f 02   
 
The intuition for this assumption runs as follows. When 2x  is very small, there is enough space on HCTs 
on every route to accommodate parcels, so that   22 xxf   and   1' 2 xf . As parcels volumes increase, 
the capacity constraint for HCTs becomes binding on an increasing number of routes, so that in the 
aggregate   22 xxf  and   1'0 2  xf . At the limit, when volumes are very large, HCTs are saturated 
on all routes and   nKxf 2  (where K is the capacity constraint of an individual HCT and where n is the 
number of routes), so that   0' 2 xf . It is assumed that the operation of volumes is such that the capacity 
constraint of the HCTs is binding on some but not all routes, so that   1'0 2  xf and   .0" 2 xf  
 
Using the same formulation as in the Section 2.2 for the cost functions, the following is obtained: 
 
       ,Fxfxx,xC TT   12121  
 
While we simplify the van delivery cost to have 
 
 6
     ,2222 VVV FcxfxxC   
 
Where Vc2  is the constant marginal delivery cost with vans. Denoting total cost by 
 
     ,xCx,xCx,xC VT 22121   
 
the following is obtained 
      ,0/, 112
1
21 
  xxf
x
xxC
 
 
         ,0')(1, 2112
21
21
2

  xfxxf
xx
xxC   
 
so that a joint cost function is obtained with positive cross derivative.   
 
In addition, 
       ,0)(1, 21122
1
21
2

   xxf
x
xxC
 
so that the total cost is increasing and concave in the number of letters. 
 
As for the impact of the number of parcels, we obtain            ,0)'1('1, 22221
2
21 
  xfcxfxfx
x
xxC V  
where the first term is the marginal HCT cost and the second term the marginal van cost, and where both 
terms are positive since having more parcels increases the number of parcels delivered both with HCTs and 
with vans. 
 
Consequently, 
 
                ),"("''1, 2222221122
2
21
2
xfcxfxfxfxxf
x
xxC V
     
where the first term pertains to the HCT cost function and is negative (so that this part of the function is 
concave) while the second term pertains to the van cost function and is positive (so that this part of the cost 
function is convex).  The aggregate cost function is then concave in the number of parcels provided that the 
second term is not too positive (i.e., that Vc2  is not too large). In that case, the aggregate cost function is 
increasing and concave separately in both the number of parcels and of letters, and exhibits a positive first 
order cross-derivative. These are the same properties as those of a simple Cobb-Douglas function. 
     12121 , xxxxC . 
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3.  Illustration 
 
For the first model analysis in Section 2.1 a numerical example is developed assuming an iso-elastic 
demand function, 
 
  ,pkpx iriiii   
 
and where costs are given by 
  ,2/111  xxc  
 
and   ,2 2/122 xxc   
so that 
  ,2, 2/122/1121 xxxxC   
 
Good 2 is twice more expensive than good 1 for any ,xxx  21  marginal costs are decreasing but total 
costs are increasing. The same elasticity is assumed for both goods: ..rr 3021   
 
The parameters ik  in the demand functions are trend parameters. These affect the size of the demand 
without changing the sensitivity of the demand functions to price (the demand elasticities). 
 
For simplicity it is assumed that .FFF 021   
 
Table 1 shows the optimal values of 1p and 2p  when ,kk 121   when 0  (so that 0 ) and when   
is obtained endogenously so that  .0  
 
Table 1: optimal values of 1p and 2p  when ,kk 121   when 0  (so 
that 0 ) and when   is obtained endogenously so that  .0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As explained above, 0  even when there is no fixed costs when   is set exogenously at 0. When   is 
set endogenously so that 0 , prices increase and we have 12 pp   since good 2 is more expensive. 
Observe that 2p  is more than twice 1p  (even though it costs exactly twice as much for the same quantity), 
because higher prices translate into lower quantities and thus into larger marginal costs. 
 
When 1k = 0.7 and 2k = 1.2, the demand elasticities are unchanged but the increase in the quantity of good 
2 is smaller than the decrease in the quantity demanded of good 1, for any price ppp  21 . The results 
are reported in Table 2. 
 
 0   = 0 
1p  0.44 1 
2p  1 2.26 
  0 0.18 
 -1.565 0 
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Table 2: optimal values of 1p and 2p  when 7.01 k  and ,2.12 k  when 
0  (so that 0 ) and when   is obtained endogenously so that  
.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to Table 1, 1p  increases while 2p  decreases (both with 0  and with endogenous ), because 
lower quantities increase marginal costs for good 1, while the opposite occurs for good 2. 
 
In contrast if it is assumed that parcels are more price elastic than letters such that 3.01 r and 12 r , the 
equivalent results to Tables 1 and 2 are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
Table 3: optimal values of 1p and 2p  when ,kk 121   when 0  (so 
that 0 ) and when   is obtained endogenously so that  0  with 
more elastic demand for parcels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: optimal values of 1p and 2p  when 7.01 k  and ,2.12 k  when 
0  (so that 0 ) and when   is obtained endogenously so that  
0  with more elastic demand for parcels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing 2r  does not change the equilibrium prices with 0  when 121  kk , but slightly decreases 
2p  when 21 kk  . Observe that there is marginal cost pricing when .0  The reason why the 
equilibrium price changes only marginally is because the marginal cost is a function of quantity, and the 
quantity demanded is affected by a variation of 2r , except in the special case where 12 p , which 
happens when 121  kk . 
 
 0   = 0 
1p  0.55 1.23 
2p  0.89 2.03 
  0 0.18 
 -1.571 0 
 
 0   = 0 
1p  0.44 1.78 
2p  1 1.59 
  0 0.26 
 -1.565 0 
 
 0   = 0 
1p  0.55 2.66 
2p  0.83 1.38 
  0 0.29 
 -1.658 0 
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When 0 , increasing 2r  increases the price of the price-inelastic good (letter) and decreases the price 
of the price-elastic good (parcel).  Hence 21 pp   even though good 2 is twice more costly to deliver than 
good 1 when 21 xx   
 
The variation of 'ik s has the same qualitative impact on equilibrium prices for the two configurations of 
demand elasticities. 
 
Observe that the Ramsey prices with endogenous  reported in Tables 1 and 2 are also EPMU prices here, 
because the mark-up over marginal costs is proportional to the same elasticity (with 21 rr  ). Table 5 
compares the EPMU prices with the Ramsey prices when the elasticities differ. With EPMU, the mark-up 
over marginal cost is exactly 100% for both goods. Good 1 is twice as cheap to deliver as good 2 (when 
21 xx  ).  With 21 pp  , this cost difference is further magnified because the marginal costs decrease 
with volume (when 21 xx  ) , such that 12 4 pp   under EPMU. Hence an EPMU rule for the recovery 
and allocation of fixed costs leads to a significantly higher cost allocation into good 2 in Table 5, when 
compared to the results shown in the previous tables. 
 
Table 5: recovery of fixed costs under EMPU, optimal values of 1p and 
2p , with more elastic demand for parcels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The postal market is changing such that letter volumes are in decline and parcel volumes 
increasing.  Current costing methods may not take account of this change and lead unit costs for 
parcels increasing disproportionately.  As parcel volume increases and letter volume declines it is 
possible that the portion of fixed cost attributed to parcels increases, stays the same or decreases 
depending on the specific cost function and its calibration.  The analysis shows how this may be 
addressed through the identification and application of appropriate cost functions. 
 
The first analysis assumes that the marginal costs of letters and packets are separate and 
decreasing in volume.  With letter volumes decreasing and parcel volumes increasing this 
functionality would increase the unit cost for letters relative to parcels.  However, this is a simple 
analysis.  The second analysis introduces two delivery methods (e.g. HCTs and vans) for letters 
and parcels and a Cobb Douglas functional form, with priority for HCTs given to letters.  For a 
single route, the results have similar properties whereby with letter volumes decreasing and parcel 
volumes increasing the same functional form for costs would increase the unit cost for letters 
relatively more than parcels.  However, this analysis assumes a single route.  Hence, the third 
analysis, introduces multiple routes and variation in the share of HCT capacity dedicated to letters 
within a Cobb Douglas functional form.  While the analytic calculations are more complex and 
introduce cross cost elasticities and therefore joint costs, the result again can be obtained whereby 
 EPMU 
1p  1 
2p  4 
  - 
 0 
121  kk , 1,3.0 21  rr  
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with letter volumes decreasing and parcel volumes increasing the functional form would increase 
the unit cost for letters relatively more than parcels.   
 
Hence, in summary, our analysis identifies the functional form for supply side cost functions that 
has the property of allocating proportionally more of the fixed cost to letters and less to parcels if 
market trends continue.  This outcome occurs simply through the supply side cost function, that is 
when the demand elasticities for letters and parcels are assumed to be the same or there is an 
EPMU mark up on marginal & joint costs. The direction of the cost allocation could be further 
strengthened from the demand side under Ramsey rules, where the demand elasticity for parcels is 
greater than that for letters as illustrated in this paper.    
 
A Cobb Douglas cost function is a particular form that assumes constant cost elasticities for the 
two goods and a particular relationship between those two elasticities.  It may be appropriate 
through empirical analysis to assess whether the cost functions have a Cobb Douglas functional 
form and what its parameter values look like in practice.  Published econometric models in 
delivery to-date have tended to focus on forms with constant cost elasticities in volume, but have 
not considered this specific point.  Rather than provide numerical estimates this paper assumes 
values to illustrate through simple examples for the first analysis, and identifies the parameters 
that would need to be valued from empirical analysis.  That is to say, it assists in identifying what 
to look for within the empirical analysis for the cost function to have the said properties.   
 
In terms of the future development and application of this type of model, its focus here has been 
on two goods and two delivery methods in outdoor delivery. Outdoor delivery comprises a 
significant portion of overall USP costs, its daily provision is a significant component within the 
universal service provision and there is known to be considerable economies of scale and scope.  
The model could be expanded to consider more goods and delivery methods.  Further, 
consideration could also be given to consider whether Cobb Douglas cost functions apply in other 
parts of the pipeline.  Moreover, consideration also could be given as to whether the USP’s goods 
continue to recover their marginal and joint costs in the presence of competition to the USP from 
alternative suppliers. 
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